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Casenotes
SIMON v. COMMISSIONER:
ARE MUSICIANS ORCHESTRATING A NEW
ENSEMBLE OF DEDUCTIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Depreciation is one of the most basic concepts inherent in the
American income tax system. Generally, it enables a taxpayer to
annually deduct from gross income a portion of the cost of an asset
used to produce income, so at the end of the asset's useful life the
aggregate amount deducted annually equals the original cost.1
From 1913 to 1981, the basic depreciation provision of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) remained relatively unchanged. 2 The Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) attempted to standardize the application
of the depreciation allowance through numerous administrative
rules until 1981, when Congress stepped in.3 Congress enacted the
Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), I.R.C. § 168 (1981), which in-
troduced the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS).4 The im-
plementation of ACRS abruptly changed the nature of the rules
controlling depreciation deductions. 5
ACRS was enacted to stimulate economic growth and simplify
depreciation rules. 6 The ACRS method for determining the depre-
1. See United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1927); S. REP. No. 97-144,
at 39 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 171 ("Depreciation is based on the
concept that the cost of an asset should be allocated over the period it is used to
produce income."). For a further discussion of depreciation, see infra notes 37-79
and accompanying text.
2. See generally JOHN F. WITrE, THE POLITICS & DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX. (Univ. of Wis. Press 1985) (discussing history of income tax).
3. See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Depreciation Policy: Whither Thou Goest, 32 Sw. L.J.
545, 550-69 (1978). For a discussion of the history behind the depreciation allow-
ance, see infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) and
the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), see infra notes 64-79 and accompa-
nying text.
5. For a discussion of ACRS as a depreciation concept, see infra notes 71-79
and accompanying text.
6. See S. REP. No. 97-144, at 47 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 171
(stating that present rules "do not provide the investment stimulus that is essential
for economic expansion" and are "unnecessarily complicated."). For a further dis-
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ciation deduction allows the taxpayer to recover the cost of tangible
property over arbitrary periods of time.7 In order to qualify for de-
preciation, the asset must be a "wasting asset," one that is subject to
exhaustion, wear and tear.8
Since its inception in 1981, courts have interpreted the ACRS
method inconsistently.9 In particular, it is unclear whether ACRS
eliminated the "useful life" requirement inherent in the deprecia-
tion scheme. In Simon v. Commissioner,10 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the useful life requirement was elimi-
nated with the effectuation of ACRS. 11 The court reached its con-
clusion through an analysis of statutory language, legislative history
and the nature of the depreciation concept. 12
This Note examines the Second Circuit's decision in Simon, in-
cluding the court's rationale and Simon's future implications. First,
section two sets forth Simon's factual background. 13 Then, section
three discusses the concept of depreciation, a4 including the history
of depreciation prior to ERTA, 15 the effect ERTA had on deprecia-
tion' 6 and the judicial interpretations of asset depreciation prior
and subsequent to ACRS. 17 Section four summarizes the majority
and dissenting opinions in Simon.18 Section five critically analyzes
7. See generally WIrE, supra note 2.
8. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (1986). For a further discussion of an asset's eligibility
for depreciation, see infra notes 43, 61, 63, 72, 77-79 and accompanying text.
9. Compare Liddle v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding
useful life unnecessary to take deduction), with Clinger v. Commissioner, 60
T.C.M. (CCH) 598 (1990) (holding ACRS only de-emphasized useful life, not elim-
inate it).
10. 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995).
11. See id. at 46. For a discussion of the Simon case, see infra notes 106-43 and
accompanying text.
12. See id. For further discussion of the court's analysis, see infra notes 106-37
and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the facts in Simon, see infra notes 21-36 and accompa-
nying text.
14. For a discussion of the concept of depreciation, see infra notes 37-47 and
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the history of depreciation prior to ERTA, see infra
notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of ERTA and its effect on depreciation, see infra notes 64-
79 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion ofjudicial interpretations of asset depreciation prior and
subsequent to ACRS, see infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the majority opinion, see infra notes 106-37 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion, see infra notes 138-43
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4: p. 327
2
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/5
ACRS & THE USEFUL LiFE REQUIREMENT
the Simon court's decision. 19 Finally, section six examines the fu-
ture implications of Simon on subsequent law. 20
II. FACTS
In 1985, Richard Simon and his wife Fiona were professional
violinists employed as full-time performers with the New York Phil-
harmonic Orchestra (Philharmonic). 21 During that year, they
purchased two minimally used Tourte violin bows for $30,000 and
$21,500 respectively. 22 The Simons purchased these violin bows for
regular use in their employment as professional violinists. 23
In 1989, the Simons used the Tourte bows on a regular basis. 24
During this year, the Tourte bows were subject to "substantial" wear
and tear from their usage, although not yet becoming "played
19. For a critical analysis of the Simon decision, see infra notes 144-62 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the future implications of Simon, see infra notes 163-69
and accompanying text.
21. See Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1995). Richard Simon
began playing the violin in 1943, when he was seven years old. See Simon v. Com-
missioner, 103 T.C. 247, 249 (1994). In 1956, he earned a bachelor's degree in
music from the Manhattan School of Music, which he attended on a full scholar-
ship. See id. Thereafter, he earned his master's degree in music from both his
alma mater and Columbia University. See id. Mr. Simon studied under many re-
nowned musicians during his educational career. See id. He joined the first violin
section of the Philharmonic in 1965, and additionally was a teacher, chamber mu-
sic player and a soloist. See id.
At four years old, Fiona Simon began to study violin. See id. From 1963 to
1971, she studied at the Purcell School in London and, from 1971 to 1973, at the
Guildhall School of Music. See id. In 1985, Fiona Simon joined the Philharmonic
in the first violin section. See id. Additionally, she was a chamber music player,
soloist and free-lance performer. See id.
22. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 42-43 (noting that bows were preserved in pristine
condition in collections). These particular violin bows were not ordinary in the
least: they were made by the premier bow maker Francois Xavier Tourte in the
nineteenth century. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 250. He was renowned for the technical
improvements that he made in bow design. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 4243.
23. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 251 ("Petitioners purchased the Tourte bows for
their tonal quality, not for their monetary value."); see also Brief for the Appellees
at 3, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) ("To com-
pete successfully at their professional level, musicians like the Simons require
equipment of the highest quality."). The bows were purchased from Moes & Moes,
Ltd., a restorer and dealer in violins and violin bows. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 250.
Prior to this purchase by Moes & Moes, Ltd., the bows belonged to the Hans Weis-
sar collection in California, which acquired them from a world-famous collection.
See id. at 279.
24. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 252. During that year, the Simons performed with
the Philharmonic in the finest concert halls across the nation and around the
world. See id. at 249. They practiced in numerous rehearsals with the Philhar-
monic, which were more time consuming and demanding than the concerts them-
selves. See id. The Simons played in four concerts per week, performing over 200
different works. See id.
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out."25 Consequently, the Simons believed that they could depreci-
ate the bows under ACRS.26
Central to understanding how Tourte bows suffer wear and
tear is an explanation of how a violin bow is constructed. There are
four parts to a violin bow: a flexible wooden stick, horsehair, a fer-
rule (screw) and a frog.2 7 The bow plays an integral part in the
production of sound, through the vibration of the stick.28
Old violins played with old bows produce a superior sound to
newer violins played with newer bows.29 When used on a regular
basis, violin bows will suffer wear and tear and eventually become
25. See id. Richard Simon "admitted that the bows showed a 'very minuscule
amount of wear."' Lee A. Sheppard, The Musicians' Tax Shelter, 64 TAX NOTES 1259,
1261 (Sept. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Sheppard, The Musicians]. Accordingly, substan-
tial testimony by Richard Simon concerning the bow's wear and tear was attributed
to the frog, ferrule and the horsehair. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 277. However, the
replacement cost for these parts is nominal. See Kevin M. Cunningham, Comment,
Which Concept of Depreciation Should Guide Us? Trying To Develop a Consistent Frame-
work for the Federal Income Tax System, 14 VA. TAX REv. 753, 756 (1995). While the
original ferrule and frog had to be replaced when the bows were purchased, the
Simons placed the originals "in a vault for safekeeping so .. .they could protect
their investment." Simon, 103 T.C. at 277. Wear and tear on a violin bow is created
in a few ways. Over time, perspiration from a player's hands penetrates the wood
in the stick, destroying the bow's performing utility. See id. at 251. Wear and tear
is also caused by cracks in the wood and using a heavy hand on the bow while
playing certain pieces of music. See id. Using a heavy hand may cause the bow to
curve and warp, since the stick may be pressed against the horsehair. See id. at 251-
52 (noting that Simons' use of bows "subjected the bows to substantial wear and
tear."); see generally Cunningham, supra, at 756 (identifying how stick suffers wear
and tear).
26. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 251. The Simons wished to depreciate the antique
violin bows over a five-year period. See Brief for the Appellant at 3, Simon v. Com-
missioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237).
27. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 250. The Tax Court described the interaction of
these four components as follows:
The horsehair is a group of single strands of hair that come from the tails
of Siberian horses. A hatchet-shaped head holds one end of the horse-
hair, and the other end is attached to a frog. The frog, which is inserted
into the stick, is a movable hollow piece by which the bow is held. The
frog has an eyepiece on the end that catches the screw. The screw is the
small knob at the end of the bow that is adjusted to tighten or loosen the
horsehair in order to change the tension on the horsehair. The horse-
hair is the part of the bow that touches the violin strings. Rosin is applied
to the horsehair to supply the frictional element that is necessary to make
the violin strings vibrate.
Id.
28. See id. The stick, which is the working part of the bow, varies in balance,
thickness and weight. See id.
29. See id. Richard Simon plays a Nicolo Amati violin, made in 1660. See id.
Fiona Simon's violin was made in 1750. See id. ("The combination of these old
violins and the Tourte bows results in a magnificent sound that is superior to the
sounds produced by newer instruments.").
[Vol. 4: p. 327
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/5
ACRS & THE USEFUL LiFE REQUIREMENT
"played out," causing an inferior sound.30 Notwi thstanding its di-
minished utility as a violin bow, the "played out" Tourte violin bow
retains its value as a collectible antique.31
The Simons claimed depreciation deductions of $6,300 and
$4,515 on the two bows.3 2 The Tax Court permitted the deduc-
tions, reasoning that such result comports with I.R.C. § 168 (1997)
and enables the Simons' to match the expenditure made on the
Tourte bows with the income generated from their use.3 3 Addition-
ally, the court found that the violin bows were "tools of a trade," not
"works of art."'34 Two judges wrote separate concurring opinions,
while three judges wrote separate dissenting opinions. 35 The Com-
30. See id. at 252. When a bow becomes "played out," the wood stick no
longer vibrates nor produces a quality sound, due to wear and tear suffered. See id.
Thus, the violin bow is inferior and of limited use to the musician. See id. The
bows were meticulously maintained in this case, casting doubt on the actual
amount of "wear and tear" suffered. See Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25, at
1262 ("This maintenance included frequent replacement of parts of the bows that
wear out quickly; that is, all parts other than the delicately carved Pernambuco
wood stick.").
31. See Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1995). There is an
independent market for the purchase and sale of Tourte and other antique violin
bows. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 252. The value of these bows is partially due to the
sticks' construction, consisting of Pernambuco wood, which is now very scarce. See
id. at 253. See also Siobhan E. Dupuy, Note, Works of Art as Depreciable Tools of a Trade
Under ACRS: Simon v. Commissioner & Liddle v. Commissioner, 48 TAX LAw. 629,
635 (1995) (acknowledging scarcity of Pernambuco wood). The wood currently
substituted for Pernambuco wood is comparatively inferior. See Simon, 103 T.C. at
253.
Furthermore, even though the bows here physically deteriorated since their
purchase in late 1985 for $30,000 and $21,500, they were appraised five years later
at $45,000 and $35,000, respectively. See id. at 252. Specifically, the sticks of the
bows were worn down. See id.
32. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 251. Both parties agreed that these amounts are the
correct amounts to be depreciated if such deduction is permitted. See id.
33. See id. at 261. The court also stated that a contrary result "would contra-
dict section 168 and vitiate the accounting principle that allows taxpayers to write
off income-producing assets against the income produced by those assets." Id.
The court found that under § 168, four prerequisites had to be satisfied before an
asset could be eligible for a depreciation deduction under ACRS: the asset must be
"(1) tangible personal property; (2) placed in service after 1980; (3) used in the
taxpayer's trade or business; and (4) subject to wear and tear from the taxpayer's
use in his trade or business." Dupuy, supra note 31, at 629 (citing Simon, 103 T.C.
at 258-61) (footnote omitted). The Tax Court found that the only real issue was
whether the instruments suffered wear and tear, since ERTA eliminated the useful
life concept. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 258-61.
34. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 635. "[I]f a work of art is used in a taxpayer's
trade or business and, through such use, is subject to wear and tear, it will not be
considered art for tax purposes." Id. In Simon, the Tax Court defined a work of art
as a "passive object, such as a painting, sculpture, or carving, that is displayed for
admiration of its aesthetic qualities." Simon, 103 T.C. at 261 n.11.
35. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 247. The first concurring opinion was written by
Judge Ruwe, who opined that the less than perfect result here is "the price of tax
1997]
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missioner subsequently appealed the decision to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit.3 6
III. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Depreciation?
Depreciation is defined as the "amount set aside for each taxa-
ble year such that at the end of the asset's useful life[37] the sum of
those amounts set aside is equivalent to the original cost of the
item. '3 8 By the application of a depreciation deduction, a taxpayer
reduces the amount of ordinary income that he must report annu-
ally.3 9 Originally, depreciation deductions were measured by an as-
simplification implicit in section 168." Id. at 267 (Ruwe,J., concurring). In a sepa-
rate opinion, Judge Beghe also concurred in the result for the same reasons set
forth in his opinion in Liddle v. Commissioner. See id. at 267-68 (Beghe, J., concur-
ring). Judge Hamblen dissented, primarily due to the belief that the Tourte bows
were not of a character subject to depreciation. See id. at 281 (Hamblen,J., dissent-
ing). Judge Hamblen supported this conclusion by finding that "It]he Tourte
bows are usable and treasured works of art whose physical life and use to petition-
ers were not lessened by wear and tear that could not be restored by current main-
tenance." Id. at 281. The second dissenting opinion, written by Judge Gerber,
suggested bifurcating the asset into a recoverable value and an intrinsic value. See
id. at 281 (Gerber, J., dissenting). Under this compromise approach, only the por-
tion of the bows that are subject to wear and tear are depreciable, not the intrinsic
value retained after the bows can no longer be used musically. See id. at 282. Fi-
nally, Judge Halpern's dissenting opinion criticized the viability of Judge Gerber's
bifurcation approach, due to the lack of a determinable useful life for the bows.
See id. at 284-85.
36. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 43. The Commissioner's position against permitting
the depreciation deductions rested on two arguments. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 258.
First, the deductions were disallowed since "the useful lives of the Tourte bows are
indeterminable because the bows are treasured works of art for which it is impossi-
ble to determine useful lives." Id. Second, the Commissioner contended that the
bows were depreciable only if they each had a determinable useful life under
I.R.C. § 167: since the bows had existed for over 100 years, the remaining useful
life was unascertainable. See id.
37. Useful life is defined as "the period of time depreciable property [is] ex-
pected to be used in the taxpayer's business or income-producing activities." Bo-
Rms I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATEs AND
GiFrs 23.1.1 (2d ed. 1989).
38. Dupuy, supra note 31, at 630 (citing United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295,
300-01 (1927)). Stated another way, "[d]epreciation is an annual deduction repre-
senting the daily decrease in value of the asset attributable to exhaustion, wear and
tear, or obsolescence." Id. at 636. See also Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-
Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income , 78 MICH. L. REv. 1, 14
(1979) ("depreciation is the amortization of the cost of an asset over the period
that the owner employs it in a profit-seeking activity.") (footnote omitted).
39. See Ludey, 274 U.S. at 300-01. Permitting depreciation is advantageous to
the taxpayer because otherwise, gains and losses are subject to capital gains tax
rates. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 754-55.
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set's declining value over time.40 Congress subsequently replaced
this method with one that relied on standardized rates, in order to
simplify depreciation rules.41
The concept of depreciation was developed in order to allow
taxpayers to accurately match the cost of an asset to the income
produced by the asset.4 2 Historically, depreciation was not allowed
for assets that were not consumed in the taxpayer's business or over
time.43 Instead, the length of time that the asset produced income
determined the quantity of depreciation deductions permitted for
the asset.44 Consequently, the "determinable useful life" concept
was needed in order to calculate the yearly depreciation allow-
ance. 45 An asset's useful life, however, can be shorter than its eco-
nomic life.46 Depreciation considers an asset valueless aside from
its income producing capacity.47
40. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 759. Both the corporation excise tax of
1909 and the Revenue Act of 1913 utilized the decrease in value depreciation sys-
tem. See id. The policy underlying depreciation deductions, however, is not so
related to the asset's decrease in value. See id. at 761.
41. See id. at 760. By 1939, depreciation included the requirement of a de-
cline in the asset's market value due to wear and tear. See id.
42. See Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960). Essen-
tially, this results in a "gradual sale" of the asset. See Ludey, 274 U.S. at 301; see also
Anthony P. Polito, Fiddlers on the Tax: Depreciation of Antique Instruments Invites Reex-
amination of Broader Tax Policy, 13 AM.J. TAX POL'Y 87 (1996) (noting that "[iun fact,
the depreciation allowance has long tended to be accelerated in some degree rela-
tive to economic depreciation.").
43. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 633 (noting that asset must be "wasting" to be
depreciated). Examples of undepreciable assets include raw land, antiques and art
work because these assets are likely to have a value greater than or equal to their
cost to the taxpayer. See id. (citing Hawkins v. Commissioner, 713 F.2d 347 (8th
Cir. 1993)); see also Cunningham, supra note 25, at 758 (concluding that violin
bows are not wasting assets and therefore do not cause economic loss).
44. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 44. See also Kahn, supra note 38, at 35 (noting that
depreciation allocates costs incurred in previous years). When determining the
amount of the deduction, the accounting concept that depreciation does not con-
sider market fluctuations in the value of the asset governs. See Fribourg Navigation
v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 277 (1966). See also Kahn, supra note 38, at 31
(reasoning that "such unrealized appreciation or depreciation is not taken into
account for tax purposes until realized."). It also does not consider the asset's
replacement cost. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 630.
45. See United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1927). See also Kahn,
supra note 38, at 15 ("[t]he 'useful life' of an asset is the amount of time that the
taxpayer expects to use the asset in his business."). Additionally, the asset's physi-
cal life can exceed its useful life. See id.
46. See Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960). Eco-
nomic life is defined as "[u]seful or profitable life of property, which may be
shorter than the physical life." BLAcK's LAW DicrioNARY 513 (6th ed. 1990).
47. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 630 (citing BomisJ. BrIKER & LAWRENCE LOK-
KEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & Girts 23.1.2 (2d ed. 1989)). This
is so because the asset is valued at the total amount that would be paid for the
income it produces. See id.
1997] 333
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B. The History of Depreciation Prior to ERTA
Prior to 1913, the United States' government lacked a constitu-
tional basis to impose an income tax on its citizens. 48 Subsequent
to ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Tariff Act of 1913
was passed, which permitted a depreciation deduction on corporate
income.4 9
Prior to ERTA, the method used to compute depreciation de-
ductions was governed by regulations, not by statute. 50 In 1920, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Bulletin F, which gave the tax-
payer the authority to select the appropriate rate of depreciation.
51
The onset of the depression in the 1930's, however, caused the gov-
ernment to tighten its reins over depreciation deductions: this was
accomplished through an amendment to Bulletin F that created a
"schedule of suggested useful lives for depreciable industrial
assets. "52
In 1942, Bulletin F was amended once again by revising the
existing useful lives and expanding the number of assets included
in the bulletin. 53 Due to administrative problems concerning disa-
greement with taxpayers' useful life estimates, coupled with a desire
to stimulate economic activity, the Internal Revenue Code of 195454
introduced accelerated depreciation methods. 55 The administra-
48. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 550. The first federal income tax was
adopted in 1861, but without a depreciation deduction. See id. It appeared that
such a deduction was prohibited by the Act of August 27, 1894. See id. However,
the Tariff Act of 1909 permitted "a reasonable allowance for depreciation of prop-
erty, if any," foreshadowing the deduction allowance in 1913. See id.
49. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 550.
50. See Brief for the Appellees at 10, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237).
51. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 551 n.57 ("The taxpayer should in all cases
determine as accurately as possible according to his judgment and experience the
rate at which his property depreciates.") (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVE-
NUE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BULL. "F" (1920)).
52. Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 551. The schedule served as a standard
against which to judge the reasonableness of the depreciation deductions taken by
the taxpayer. See id. Consequently, the "Bulletin F standardized lives enjoyed a
presumption of validity and grew in importance." Id. at 552.
53. See id. at 552. The revised bulletin provided useful life estimates for ap-
proximately 5,000 assets. See id.
54. See Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
55. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 554-55 & n.90 (stating that "[a] ccelerated
depreciation was restricted to tangible property with a useful life of three years or
more constructed or acquired after 1953."). See also Polito, supra note 42, at 96
(observing that "[ t] he history of the depreciation allowance is largely one of accel-
erating tax depreciation relative to economic depreciation and thereby exaggerat-
ing the discrepancy between income tax depreciation allowances and the actual
consumption of assets."). Through the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, taxpayers
were given a choice of two accelerated methods: the sum of the years-digits
[Vol. 4: p. 327
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tive problems surrounding useful life estimates and the desire to
stimulate economic growth, however, would continue to be the
stimuli for depreciation policy changes through 1981, with the en-
actment of ACRS. 56
Bulletin F was abolished in 1962 for a more general approach
to determining useful life. 57 Its replacement, Revenue Procedure
62-61, classified depreciable property into four groups, each con-
taining numerous classes. 58 Each class had its own "guideline life"
to use in computing depreciation deductions. 59 This basic group
classification approach continued with the Asset Depreciation
Range System (ADR), implemented in 1971.60 ADR was inter-
preted as requiring an asset to have a useful life in order to be eligi-
ble for depreciation. 61 Under the ADR, guideline lives were
established by the IRS for categories of tangible personal prop-
method and the declining balance method. See Alan J. Auerbach, The New Econom-
ics of Accelerated Depreciation, 23 B.C. L. REv. 1327, 1329 (1982). Prior to 1954, per-
missible types of accelerated depreciation were seldom used by taxpayers. See
Kahn, supra note 38, at 30.
56. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 568-69 (explaining that similar motivations
were behind adoption of asset depreciation range system (ADR)); Kahn, supra
note 38, at 16 (same). For a discussion of how these factors prompted the enact-
ment of ACRS, see infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
57. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 556-57 ("The Bulletin F useful lives ...
generated animosity in the business community and administrative difficulty for
the Service.") (footnote omitted).
58. See id. at 556-57. The four groups were general business, manufacturing,
nonmanufacturing and transportation, communications and public utilities. See
id. Each group contained from five to thirty classes of property. See id. at 557.
59. See id. at 557. See generally Auerbach, supra note 55, at 1329-30 (explaining
that allowing investors to write off assets over shorter periods of time encourages
investment). The use of guideline lives replaced the useful life approach, and
were on average 30-40% shorter in duration. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 557.
60. See Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 567 (describing ADR depreciation and
Revenue Act of 1971); Auerbach, supra note 55, at 1327 n.4 ("The ADR system
created various depreciation write-off periods for various classes of depreciable as-
sets."); Cunningham, supra note 25, at 763 (generally describing ADR); Brian R.
Bassett, Note, Simon v. Commissioner and Liddle v. Commissioner: Has the Tax
Court Been "Fiddling" Around with Depreciation?, 75 B.U. L. REv. 837, 844 (1995)
(same). Before ERTA was enacted, depreciation was calculated "by determining
the useful life of the property, determining the salvage value, and distributing the
excess of the original cost over the salvage value for the years the property would
be used." Dupuy, supra note 31, at 630. The amount the asset is worth at the end
of its useful life connotes its salvage value. See id. at 630 n.14.
61. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 763. Ironically, a useful life was a pre-
requisite for the asset to be assigned to a class to determine its useful life. See id.;
see also Lischer, Jr., supra note 3, at 567 ("The major purpose of ADR depreciation
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erty.62 Thus, an asset with an indeterminable useful life was not
eligible for depreciation deductions under ADR.63
C. The Economic Recovery Tax Act
In 1981, Congress enacted the Economic Recovery Tax Act
(ERTA), which altered the depreciation scheme, in an effort to fur-
ther certain policy objectives. 64 Congress's primary purpose in
changing the depreciation scheme was to stimulate economic
growth.65 Specifically, higher rates of inflation caused the real
value of depreciation deductions to decline. 66 Consequenly, this
resulted in the diminished profitability of new investments and dis-
couraged businesses from upgrading their equipment and build-
ings. 67 Congress's attempt to solve this problem came through the
implementation of ACRS, which it considered to be "an effective
way of stimulating capital formation, increasing productivity and
improving the nation's competitiveness in international trade."68
In addition, by enacting ACRS Congress sought to simplify the de-
62. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 630. See also Cunningham, supra note 25, at
763 (stating that "the ADR system grouped the property into broad classes of in-
dustry assets, and assigned each class a useful life."). Under the ADR, taxpayers
had the option to depreciate the asset over a time period 20% shorter or longer
than the guideline period. SeeAuerbach, supra note 55, at 1330; Bassett, supra note
60, at 844. This option furthered Congress's goal of minimizing taxpayer disputes
with the IRS. See Bassett, supra note 60, at 844.
63. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 763.
64. See Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), I.R.C. § 168 (1997); see also Bors
I. BrITKER & MARTINJ. MCMAI-bON,JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDMDUALS
12.1.2 (1988) (noting that new rules "depart[ ] dramatically" from old rules);
Auerbach, supra note 55 at 1327 (stating that ERTA created "several significant
changes in the tax law that together represented the most substantial cut in corpo-
rate and personal income taxes ever."); Dupuy, supra note 31, at 630 (observing
that "[t]his statute radically overhauled the rules used to determine deprecia-
tion."). In furtherance of these policy objectives, a system was created that has
"little to do with measuring economic income." BITrKER & MCMAHON, JR., supra,
at 12.1.2.
65. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 45. ACRS, however, has been criticized as being "very
distortionary in its distribution across different assets and sensitive to the rate of
inflation." Auerbach, supra note 55, at 1350.
66. See S. REP. No. 97-144, at 47 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105,
152.
67. See id.
68. Id. The purpose of ACRS is to allow taxpayers to "recover tax free the cost
(or other basis) of property exhausted in the process of generating business in-
come." BITTKER & MCMAHON, JR., supra note 64, at 12.1.3. However, since ACRS
is merely a method of cost allocation, it does not reflect the asset's actual decline
in value. See id.; see also Polito, supra note 42, at 87 (criticizing ACRS as "vastly
exagger[ating] th[e] anomalous nature of the depreciation allowance."). Addi-
tionally, ACRS is said to inch taxation of businesses closer to a consumption tax.
See id.
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preciation rules.69 Through ACRS, Congress endeavored to de-em-
phasize the concept of useful life because it is "inherently
uncertain" and its determination results in frequent disagreements
between taxpayers and the IRS. 70
In order to accomplish these objectives, Congress accelerated
the depreciation period of assets through ACRS under ERTA.
71
ACRS permits depreciation deductions for "recovery property," as
defined by I.R.C. § 168.72 Once an asset is deemed to be "recovery
property," the taxpayer must assign the asset to the proper table to
determine the applicable depreciation deduction. 73 Finally, the
69. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 45; see also Dupuy, supra note 31, at 630-31 (stating
that "Congress found that the former system of determining useful life was 'com-
plex' and 'inherently uncertain,' and led to frequent disagreements between tax-
payers and the Service."); Cunningham, supra note 25, at 763 (noting that
Congress enacted ERTA to simplify depreciation system).
70. See S. RFP. No. 97-144 ("The committee believes that a new capital cost
recovery system should be structured which de-emphasizes the concept of useful
life, minimizes the number of elections and exceptions, and so is easier to comply
with and administer"); see also Bassett, supra note 60, at 843 (noting that "the use-
ful-life issue proved to be a fruitful source of litigation."). Congress de-emphasized
the useful life concept by replacing guideline lives with recovery periods. See Du-
puy, supra note 31, at 631. The result was a simplification of depreciation rules,
since it was now unnecessary to determine an asset's useful life to determine its
recovery period. See id. But see Brief for the Appellees at 16, Simon v. Commis-
sioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) (stating that "the former need for
a determination of 'useful life' had been erased.").
71. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 45. ACRS applies only to tangible assets placed in
service after 1980. See Auerbach, supra note 55, at 1334. In a nutshell, under ACRS
"the cost of tangible property is generally recovered over an arbitrary period speci-
fied by statute for each of several broad classes of property." BITTKER & MCMAHON,
JR., supra note 64, at 1 12.1.2. "Anti-churning" rules prevent a taxpayer from tak-
ing ACRS deductions on property placed in service prior to 1981. See Auerbach,
supra note 55, at 1334.
ACRS uses a combination of depreciation methods by "mimic [ing] the use of
150% declining balance with a switch-over to straight-line in the later years."
Auerbach, supra note 55, at 1332. Furthermore, taxpayers may opt to elect the
straight-line over depreciated method instead of ACRS, but this election is made
on a class-by-class basis. See id. at 1333 & n.50.
72. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 631. Recovery property is defined as "tangible
property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation- (A) used in a
trade or business, or (B) held for the production of income." I.R.C.
§ 168(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1997). Section 168 is normally read in conjunction with the
applicable provisions of § 167, which provides:
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allow-
ance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance
for obsolescence)- (1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of
property held for the production of income. In the case of recovery
property (within the meaning of section 168), the deduction allowable
under section 168 shall be deemed to constitute the reasonable allowance
provided by this section ....
I.R.C. § 167(a)(1)-(2) (1997).
73. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 764. Assets are classified as either 3, 5,
10 or 15 year property. See id. (citing I.R.C. § 168(c)(2) (1981)).
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taxpayer takes a depreciation allowance based on the applicable
percentage found in the tables.74
Under ACRS, the cost of an asset is recovered over a predeter-
mined amount of time, unrelated to the useful life of the asset. 75
The system inflates depreciation deductions in the asset's early
years of life.7 6 Consequently, the determinable useful life require-
ment is eliminated since the asset is not depreciated over its actual
useful life.77 Alternatively, the legislative history behind ERTA
shows a different intent: the House Conference Report does not
permit assets without a determinable useful life to be depreciated. 78
74. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 764 (citing I.R.C. § 168(b)(1)(A)-(C)(1981)). However, since the time period is arbitrary, the decline in the property's
value over its useful life generally is less than the total amount of ACRS deductions
taken. See BixI-KER & MCMAHON, JR., supra note 64, at 12.1.3.
75. See I.R.C. § 168(b) (1981); see also Polito, supra note 42, at 97 (noting that
"Congress largely abandoned any attempt clearly to reflect income" under new
matching scheme). ACRS replaced the ADR's use of guideline lives. See Dupuy,
supra note 31, at 631 (noting that recovery periods do not estimate actual useful
lives). ACRS substituted a new concept: it established definite recovery periods,
each having a statutorily mandated time period to recover depreciation. See id.
76. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 631. The front-loading of deductions is like
"an interest-free loan from the Treasury to the purchaser of the asset, since it al-
lows the purchaser to defer tax payments to later years with no increase in the
amount due." Auerbach, supra note 55, at 1329. Furthermore, income realized by
the asset once it is fully depreciated is computed as if use of the asset is costless. See
Brl'-xKR & MCMAHON, JR., supra note 64, at 12.1.4.
77. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 763; see also Auerbach, supra note 55, at
1334 (stating that recovery period is not intended to have any close relationship to
"useful life" concept). Additionally, the concept of salvage value becomes irrele-
vant under ACRS. See S. REP. No. 97-144, at 47 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 152; see also Sheppard, The Musicians', supra note 25, at 1263
(noting that although salvage value is irrelevant for ACRS, it is relevant to deterio-
ration in value); Polito, supra note 42, at 101 (noting that ACRS' abandonment of
salvage value lifted restriction on depreciation deductions to assets that declined in
value only).
78. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-215, at 206 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 281, 296. Specifically, the House Conference Report states:
Under present law, assets used in a trade or business or for the produc-
tion of income are depreciable if they are subject to wear and tear, decay
or decline from natural causes or obsolescence. Assets that do not de-
cline in value on a predictable basis or that do not have a determinable
useful life, such as land, goodwill, and stock, are not depreciable.
Id. Note that the last sentence of this specific excerpt from the House Conference
Report has been interpreted differently by both the Commissioner and the
Simons. Compare Brief for the Appellees at 18-19, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d
41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) (pointing to this language as support), with Brief
for the Appellant at 17-18, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No.
94-4237) ("the majority's decision cannot be squared with the Conference Com-
mittee Report."). See also Polito, supra note 42, at 100 (observing that Conference
Report is unclear as to which interpretation it enunciates). The Simons' attempt
to "explain away" and distinguish this sentence from the violin bows at issue by
construing it in the following manner: "the categories referred to are all things
that do not in the relevant sense suffer wear and tear and thus neither wear out
[Vol. 4: p. 327
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B. Common Law Doctrines Requiring Disclosure
Even if a waiver were held to waive the disclosure requirements
of the Act, a duty to disclose might arise from common law. Pre-
sumably, Congress designed the Act to benefit future student-ath-
letes and the Act was not intended to be a "one-shot" deal for the
year the Act was enacted; there must be compliance in each year
subsequent to the Act. Therefore, universities obtaining waivers are
still required to continue to compile the data specified by the Act.
Once the information is known to the university, there will be a
duty to disclose whenever the university is in a confidential relation-
ship with a prospective student-athlete. The duty is owed whenever
"one party to a transaction justifiably believes the other is looking
out for his interests ....*"126 Such a confidential relationship can
arise well outside of traditional fiduciary relationships. 127 In the
context of athletic recruiting, it might arise when a religiously-affili-
ated university recruits a coreligionist. 128 A court could reasonably
find that where an institution of higher learning held itself out as a
representative of a prospective student-athlete's church, a prospec-
tive student-athlete could justifiably believe the institution was look-
ing out for his or her interests.
Under some circumstances, even a state university may have an
affirmative duty to disclose graduation rates once it has compiled
them. As noted above, student-athletes and universities are parties
to a contract. 129 While a state actor is not in a confidential relation-
ship with its contractors merely by virtue of the fact it is a state ac-
tor, 3 0 it may have a duty to disclose beyond that of private parties.
For example, some state courts have held that "[w]here resort to
the state is the only reasonable avenue for acquiring the informa-
institution incurs little additional burden by providing the information directly. A
court would likely infer that the institution failed to provide the information solely
because it did not wish the prospective student-athlete to make a rational decision,
based on the best available information. Given this motive, a court would feel
some compulsion to grant relief.
126. CALAMAIU & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 9-20, at 369-70.
127. See, e.g., Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 983 (7th Cir.
1978).
128. Nothing in the First Amendment would prevent a court from finding a
confidential relationship under these circumstances. "The clause does not allow
purely secular statements of fact to be shielded from legal action merely because
they are made by officials of a religious organization." In Re The Bible Speaks, 869
F.2d 628, 645 (1st Cir. 1989). Presumably this analysis would extend with equal
force to statements of fact which should have been made but were not.
129. See supra note 83 for a further discussion on how a party would seek to
void a contract.
130. See Helene Curtis Indus. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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tion, the state must disclose it, and may not claim as a defense
either the contractor's failure to make an independent request or
exculpatory language in the contract documents."1 31 Thus, a uni-
versity would have an affirmative duty to offer the information on
graduation rates even if the same information were available
through a state Freedom of Information Act, so long as there was
no other "reasonable avenue" to obtain the information. 32
Finally, any university may have a duty to disclose or more spe-
cifically, may be guilty of an affirmative misrepresentation, if its
graduation rates are published in a manner calculated to make
them difficult to discover. 133
VI. STRATEGIES TO AVOID LIABILITY
The Act, if ignored, may expose universities with active athletic
programs to significant liability. Even if successfully defended, a
court case entails both legal fees and adverse publicity. The follow-
ing suggestions may help universities limit this exposure: 1) have a
formal, written, recruiting policy in compliance with the Act. Puni-
tive damages are the largest single source of exposure. Universities
with successful athletics programs and a policy of noncompliance
will be tempting targets for their assessment. In addition, the puni-
tive damages carrot will make these institutions a popular target for
litigation; 2) train athletic recruiters on acceptable recruiting tac-
tics and document their training. Properly trained recruiters will
significantly lower exposure. Should a plaintiff be successful, evi-
dence of proper training will make the assessment of punitive dam-
ages less likely; 3) include a merger clause in the financial aid
statement.134 While this will be valueless in defending against a
131. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Alaska, 519 P.2d 834, 841 (Alaska 1974).
132. This might occur, for example, when an athletic association has received
a waiver for its members by promising to publish graduation rates, but has not yet
done so.
133. "Positive action designed to hide the truth or to stymie the other party's
investigation is deemed to constitute misfeasance that can result in liability for
misrepresentation." CALMPj & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 9-20, at 367. The gradu-
ation rates would not be published by individual schools, but rather by "an athletic
association or athletic conference." 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e)(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
Thus, the university itself would not undertake the actual concealment. It might,
however, be possible to impute the athletic association's action to the university on
an agency theory, especially if the university was aware of the athletic association's
actions. See HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAw OF AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP, § 201, at 305 (2d ed. 1990).
134. For example, "[t]he University and the Student agree that this financial
aid statement represents our entire agreement and that any prior agreements or
promises, either written or oral, are void."
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As a result of this disparity, the viability of the determinable useful
life requirement under ERTA is uncertain. 79
D. Judicial Analysis of Depreciation Deductions
1. Pre-A CRS
Although ACRS was enacted in 1981, it did not apply to assets
placed in service before 1981. Accordingly, in these circumstances
courts had to apply the old ADR scheme instead. The first case to
address this issue after the enactment of ACRS was Harrah's Club v.
United States.80 The issue faced by the court in Harrah's was whether
a taxpayer may depreciate the cost of antique automobiles dis-
played at the taxpayer's place of business in order to attract custom-
ers.8 1 The court held that since the restored vehicles have an
unlimited museum life, they are undepreciable. 82 The court, there-
fore, rejected the concept of the depreciability of property lacking a
useful life.
Two years later, in Hawkins v. Commissioner, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit was faced with a depreciation deduc-
tion taken under the ADR for artwork.8 3 An attorney contended
that he was entitled to claim a depreciation deduction for artwork
nor 'depreciate' in any accustomed usage." Brief for the Appellees at 19, Simon v.
Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237). The error in this con-
struction lies in its failure to read the sentence as a whole, which cites those catego-
ries merely as examples of the principle that it sets forth. See Reply Brief for the
Appellant at 5, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237)
(stating that "the Conference Committee Report specifically refers to property
lacking a determinable useful life."). "It is difficult if not impossible to read [Sec-
tion 168(c) (1)] in light of the conference agreement and believe that the confer-
ees intended property with an indeterminable useful life to be eligible for ACRS."
Liddle v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 285, 304 (1994) (Halpern, J., dissenting).
79. See Polito, supra note 42, at 105 (observing that "[iln the space of two
sentences the Conference Committee states both the determinable useful life stan-
dard and the wear and tear standard.").
80. 661 F.2d 203 (Ct. Cl. 1981). Harrah's business consisted of operating ho-
tels and gambling casinos. See id. Harrah's Automobile Collection was created in
order to lure customers to Harrah's hotels and casinos. See id.
81. See id. The plaintiff in Harrah's exhibited approximately 1,000 antique
vehicles in like-new condition. See id. at 204.
82. See id. at 207-09. The taxpayer argued that the automobiles should be
depreciable since they lose their novelty after a few years, ceasing to perform their
function of attracting customers. See id. at 206. The court rebutted this argument,
reasoning that because no limit can be put on the vehicles' use as museum objects,
the vehicles are useful to the taxpayer indefinitely. See id. at 207. Usually,
automobiles used for business purposes will be depreciable because they are sub-
ject to wear and tear and have a measurable useful life. See Cunningham, supra
note 25, at 766.
83. 713 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1983). The artwork in this case included mosaics,
paintings and statutes, purchased for $126,453.15. See id. at 349.
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displayed in his law office.8 4 The Eighth Circuit denied the deduc-
tion, ruling that the attorney failed to prove that the artwork had a
depreciable useful life or salvage value.8 5
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
Browning v. Commissioner, a case concerning depreciation deduc-
tions taken for violins. 86 Louis Browning was a professional violin-
ist8 7 who purchased antique violins and used them in the course of
his trade.88 The Ninth Circuit refused to allow Browning to take
depreciation deductions on the violins, since Browning failed to
show any real decrease in their value. 89 The court required a useful
life to be established before the violins could be depreciated.90 Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that violins are more like works of
art than a business asset. 91 The court supported this conclusion by
reasoning that violins have an extended useful life that cannot be
depreciated. 92
84. See id.
85. See id. at 354. In a footnote, the court implied that it would permit depre-
ciation of artwork if the taxpayer could determine the asset's useful life, contrary
to the Commissioner's position. See id. at 353 n.11.
Under similar facts, the Sixth Circuit denied depreciation deductions for art-
work in a physician's office, holding that the doctor provided insufficient evidence
to sustain the 10-year useful life estimate that he attributed to the artwork. See
Associated Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Commissioner, 762 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.
1985). The court's application of pre-ERTA rules mandated that a determinable
useful life be established for the asset, in order to allow the depreciation deduc-
tion. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 634. In this case, the physician purchased over
70 paintings, sculptures, pottery and batik prints, at an aggregate cost of
$75,410.32. See Associated Obstetricians, 762 F.2d at 39.
86. 890 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1989).
87. See id. at 1085. Louis Browning performed in bars, nightclubs and for
private engagements. See id.
88. See id. Browning bought three antique violins: a Ruggeri for $24,000 in
1978, a Stradivarius for $130,000 in 1979 and a Gabrielli for $27,000 in 1981. See
id. All three violins were certified as authentic. See id. at 1085.
89. See id. The court relied in part on expert testimony that placed a value of
$225,000-275,000 on the Stradivarius violin. See id. at 1086. In Browning, it was
debatable whether the violins purchased by Browning had in fact suffered any wear
and tear while in his possession. See Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25, at
1262. It was suspected that Browning's motive lied instead in collecting the violins
as an investment. See id. See also Dupuy, supra note 31, at 634 (noting that "the
court suspected that the taxpayer was forming a collection of antique violins.").
90. See Browning, 890 F.2d at 1086. The court required the satisfaction of a
three-prong test in order to allow depreciation of a business asset: (1) cost of prop-
erty; (2) salvage value; and (3) useful life. See id. at 1086 (citing 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.167(a)-i).
91. See id. at 1086-87 (noting that "the violins have a value independent of
their tonal qualities and that value makes the violins more like pieces of art.").
92. See id. (explaining that physical condition of artwork usually does not de-
termine its useful life). The court sustained the Tax Court's opinion that the
Brownings failed to prove "that violins which had already survived for over two
hundred years had only twelve years remaining in their useful lives." Id.
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As the preceding decisions illustrate, under the ADR courts
agreed that in order for an asset to be depreciable, it needed to
have a determinable useful life.93 Whether this requirement re-
mained intact after the implementation of ACRS is not quite so
clear, as the next section on post-ACRS case law will demonstrate.
2. Post-A CRS
Depreciation deductions taken under ACRS present a problem
different from those taken under ADR: the determination of a use-
ful life. Under ACRS, there is disagreement as to whether ACRS
eliminated ADR's requirement of a useful life as a prerequisite to
permitting a depreciation deduction. This dilemma arose in Clinger
v. Commissioner,94 when a professional artist claimed a depreciation
deduction for an oil painting. The artist purchased the painting for
three reasons: to establish credibility, facilitate marketing and for
use as a subject of study, to perfect her artistic abilities. 95 The court
denied Clinger the deduction because she did not meet her burden
of proof: she failed to establish the useful life of the oil painting,
therefore it was not depreciable recovery property under § 168.96
Thus, the court held that ACRS did not eliminate the determinable
useful life requirement for an asset to be depreciable, it only de-
emphasized it.97
The preceding trend of fourteen years, requiring proof of use-
ful life in order to permit a depreciation deduction, was broken in
Liddle v. Commissioner.98 In Liddle, the Court of Appeals for the
93. See Polito, supra note 42, at 103 (observing that pre-ACRS case law "is
unambiguous in predicating depreciability on the taxpayer's ability to prove that
its assets have determinable useful lives."). In addition, this section of case law
"sought to mitigate the misstatement of income by compelling taxpayers to esti-
mate salvage values for their assets." Id. at 94.
94. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 598, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 504 (1990). The oil
painting was created by Alvin Gittins, a former instructor of the taxpayer and a
well-known artist in the area. See id. at 598. The painting was purchased from
Gittins' estate for $9,000. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. The burden of proof fell on Clinger because "the Service's deter-
minations are presumptively correct." Dupuy, supra note 31, at 632 (citing Welch
v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933)).
97. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 632 (citing Clinger, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 599);
Bassett, supra note 60, at 850 (citing Clinger, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 599). See generally
Joseph M. Dodge & Deborah A. Geier, Simon Says: A Liddle Night Music with Those
Depreciation Deductions, Please, 69 TAx NoTEs 617, 617 (Oct. 30, 1995) (discussing
disagreement among courts as to useful life requirement under ACRS).
98. 65 F.3d 329 (3d. Cir. 1995).
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Third Circuit was faced with facts similar to those in Browning.9 9
Liddle was a professional musician who purchased a valuable bass
violin, to be used as a tool in his trade. 10 0 Liddle sought a deprecia-
tion deduction on the bass violin, even though the instrument in-
creased in value during the period of Liddle's ownership. 10 1 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit allowed the depreciation de-
duction, and provided two reasons in support of its decision. 10 2
First, the court stated that a determinable useful life is not a neces-
sary prerequisite to taking an ACRS deduction. 0 3 Instead, the
property only has to be subject to "wear and tear."'01 4 Additionally,
the court held that since Liddle used the bass violin as a tool of his
trade and not as a work of art, the bass violin is exempt from the
rule that a work of art cannot be depreciated. 10 5
99. See id. at 331. For a discussion of the facts surrounding Browning, see supra
notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
Liddle made a similar claim to Browning, that the violin's musical quality dete-
riorated with use. See Liddle, 65 F.3d at 331. Oddly enough, there is evidence to
the contrary. One commentator noted that "not only do Stradivarius violins not
lose value, but also they get better with playing." Lee A. Sheppard, Would More
Expertise Have Helped in the Violin Cases?, 70 TAx NoTEs 1314 (Mar. 4, 1996) [herein-
after Sheppard, Violin Cases]. Physicists at the School of Engineering Systems and
Design at London's South Bank University found that wood instruments need to
be played continuously in order to maintain an enhanced resonance. See id.
100. See Liddle, 65 F.3d at 330. According to Liddle's counsel, the violin was
purchased for its voice quality. See Telephone Interview with David L. Segal, Attor-
ney for Brian P. Liddle (Jan. 30, 1997). Specifically, Liddle purchased a 17th cen-
tury Ruggeri violin for $28,000 in 1984. See Liddle, 65 F.3d at 330. However, the
purchase was subject to at least a 15-year mortgage. See Telephone Interview with
David L. Segal, Attorney for Brian P. Liddle (Jan. 30, 1997). Interestingly enough,
the Ruggeri violin was subsequently traded in a like-kind exchange, since the audi-
tion committee at the Minnesota Symphony no longer liked the violin's voice.- See
id.
101. See Liddle, 65 F.3d at 330. The bass violin appreciated $10,000 in value
from 1984 to 1987, and was traded in 1991 for a Domenico Busan violin appraised
at $65,000. See id. at 330-31.
102. See Sheppard, Violin Cases, supra note 99, at 1314. The appellant argued
that permitting depreciation of the antique violin created the anomalous result
that an antique violin that "has been used for some 300 years will be depreciable
over a 5-year period." Brief for the Appellant at 10, Liddle v. Commissioner, 65
F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-7733). See also Lee A. Sheppard, Violins, Ferraris,
and the Music of Class Lives, 69 TAX NoTEs 669, 669 (Nov. 6, 1995) [hereinafter
Sheppard, Ferraris] (criticizing Liddle decision for allowing depreciation deduc-
tions where there is no wear and tear).
103. See Liddle, 65 F.3d at 332-33. "The entire cost or other basis of eligible
property is recovered under ACRS, eliminating the salvage value limitation of prior
depreciation law." Id. at 333.
104. See id. at 334. The phrase "wear and tear" also includes obsolescence or
exhaustion. See I.R.C. § 168 (1997).
105. See Dupuy, supra note 31, at 638 (noting that "but for the viol's use by the
taxpayer as a full-time musician, it would be a nondepreciable work of art.").
Works of art are not depreciable because they do not have a determinable useful
life. See id. at 633 (citing Hawkins v. Commissioner, 713 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1983)).
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IV. NARRATrvE ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
The Simon majority stylized its opinion by first setting out the
issues that both parties agreed upon, and then addressing the argu-
ments made by each on the points of disagreement. 10 6 The parties'
disagreements stemmed from different readings of the text of the
Internal Revenue Code. 10 7 Further, the parties disagreed on the
fundamental nature of depreciation.10 8 Finally, the Commission
pointed to legislative history to support its position. 10 9 After find-
ing for the Simons on each of these issues, the court defended its
holding by: (1) distinguishing precedent, (2) rebutting the implica-
tion of favorable treatment of wasteful investments and (3) stressing
the limited scope of its holding."10
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit began its analysis
by directly stating that the essence of the argument "turns on the
interpretation of the ACRS provisions of I.R.C. § 168."111 The court
noted the one point on which both parties agreed: the phrase "of a
character subject to depreciation" in § 168 must be read in light of
§ 167(a), which permits allowances for "exhaustion, wear and tear,
and . . . obsolescence."' 12 The court addressed the textual argu-
ment first, which turned on the parties' differing interpretations of
§§ 167 and 168 when read together. The Simons contended that
when the two sections are read together, the plain language of the
provisions requires only that the bows suffer wear and tear in their
See also Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79 (explaining that while "actual physical
condition of the property may influence the value placed on the object, it will not
ordinarily limit or determine the useful life. Accordingly, depreciation of works of
art generally is not allowable.").
106. For a discussion of the issue agreed upon by both parties, see infra note
112 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the issues argued by the parties,
see infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of the textual argument, see infra notes 113-16 and ac-
companying text.
108. For a discussion of the nature of depreciation argument, see infra notes
117-21 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the legislative history argument, see infra notes 122-24
and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's defense of its holding, see infra
notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
111. Simon, 68 F.3d at 43. The court explained § 168 as "provid[ing] a depre-
ciation deduction for 'recovery property' placed into service after 1980." Id. For a
further discussion of recovery property, see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
112. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 167(a)). For a more complete excerpt of §§ 167
and 168, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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trade, in order to qualify as recovery property." 3 Conversely, the
Commissioner argued that such a reading would render portions of
the provision superfluous because all property used in a trade is
necessarily subject to wear and tear. 14 Instead, the Commissioner
stated that these portions of the section include the "determinable
useful life" requirement.115 The court found for the Simons on the
textual argument. It rejected the Commissioner's superfluous lan-
guage argument, reasoning that there are tangible items not sub-
ject to wear and tear. 116
Next, the court analyzed the nature of depreciation argument.
The Tax Court found that imposing a useful life requirement
would resurrect the disagreements that Congress intended to cur-
tail by enacting ERTA. 117 The Second Circuit agreed with this rea-
soning, rejecting the Commissioner's depreciation argument since
the different design of ACRS does not utilize the useful life con-
cept.118 Furthermore, the court rejected the Commissioner's con-
tention that requiring useful life for a narrow category of property
is in accord with the legislative intent of de-emphasizing useful
life. 1 9 Instead, the court stressed that useful life is measured by the
particular business's use of the asset, not by the abstract economic
life of the asset in any business. 120 Additionally, the court added
that the notion of useful life does not affect the asset's eligibility
under ACRS: thus, the Commissioner's position of denying the as-
set eligibility avoids ERTA's "explicit rejection of 'salvage value."' "'l
Finally, the court addressed the Commissioner's argument that
§§ 167 and 168 should be interpreted in light of their legislative
history. In particular, the Commissioner relied on the House Con-
113. See id.
114. See id. at 44. Specifically, the Commissioner contends that such a read-
ing of the two sections makes the phrase "of a character subject to the allowance
for depreciation" superfluous. See id.
115. See id. The determinable useful life requirement is found in 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.167(a)-i (1997).
116. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 44.
117. See Simon v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 247, 258-59 (1994). "ERTA was
enacted partially to address and eliminate the issue that we are faced with today,
namely, a disagreement between taxpayers and the Commissioner over the useful
lives of assets that were used in Taxpayers' trade or business." Id.
118. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 45.
119. See id. Such a narrow category of property would include usable antiques
and other business property likely to appreciate in real value. See id.
120. See id. (citing Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 97
(1960)).
121. Id. at 45. See also Brief for Appellee at 18, Simon v. Commissioner, 68
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) ("No trace was left of the notion that depreci-
ation is allowable generally only for assets for which a 'useful life' is determined.").
[Vol. 4: p. 327
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/5
ACRS & THE USEFUL LiiE REQUIREMENT
ference Report. 122 The court noted a portion of the House Confer-
ence Report which states that, "[a] ssets that do not decline in value
on a predictable basis or that do not have a determinable useful life
.. .are not depreciable." 123 While the court conceded that this
legislative history made it pause, the court concluded that two state-
ments found in legislative history are not enough to trump the stat-
utory language and legislative intent.1 24
In reaching its decision, the court defended its position in sev-
eral ways. 125 First, the court noted that its decision did not conflict
with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Browning.126 In Browning, the
Ninth Circuit disallowed a professional violinist from taking depre-
ciation deductions on an antique violin. 127 The court explained
that the Browning court failed to discuss § 168, ERTA or ACRS in its
opinion.128 In addition, the Browning opinion referred to the sal-
vage value of the violin in question.' 29 The court found this refer-
ence erroneous, since salvage value is an obsolete concept under
ACRS for recovery property.' 30
Next, the court acknowledged that its holding could give
favorable treatment to some wasteful investments.' 3 ' Here, the
court outlined the scope of its powers. Specifically, the court deter-
mined that it is not its function to draw the line between what is
wasteful and what is productive, in light of Congress's intent to
stimulate investment in business property.13 2 The court stated that
it was in fact obligated to assure that the Commissioner, in his ef-
forts to maximize revenue, does not thwart Congress's intent to
122. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 46 (citing H.R. CoNt. REP. No. 97-215, at 206
(1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 296).
123. Id.
124. See id. The Simon court reasoned that the overall legislative history of
ERTA "definitively repudiates the scheme of complex depreciation rules." Id. The
court concluded that the portions of the House Conference Report relied on by
the Commissioner sharply conflicted with this overall intent. See id.
125. See id.
126. Browning v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 1084, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989). For a dis-
cussion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Browning, see supra notes 86-92 and ac-
companying text.
127. See id.
128. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 46.
129. See id.
130. See id. The Tax Court distinguished Browning on the ground that the
taxpayer failed to supply credible evidence that the violins were depreciable prop-
erty. See id. at 46 n.6. The Second Circuit did not rely on these grounds, however,
in the appeal. See id.
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generate economic growth. 133 Furthermore, the court concluded
that Congress's goals would be frustrated if taxpayers were leery of
the viability of these types of investment incentives through the ac-
tions of the Commissioner.' 34
Finally, the court emphasized the limited scope of its holding.
The court specifically stated that its ruling is not a "license to hoard
and depreciate valuable property that a taxpayer expects to appreci-
ate in real economic value.' 35 Instead, the holding is limited to
property placed in service between January 1, 1981 and January 1,
1987 and to the concept of "recovery property."'1 6 Furthermore,
the court reiterated that the test to be applied is whether the asset
will suffer wear and tear, exhaustion or obsolescence in its use by a
business.137
B. Dissenting Opinion
Senior circuit Judge Oakes attacked the majority opinion, cit-
ing the statutory language of § 168, its legislative history and rules
of statutory construction. Judge Oakes began by pointing out the
majority's failure to acknowledge the textual cross-references to
§§ 167, 168(c) (2) and 1245(a) (3) in § 168(c), which extensive case
law has interpreted to require that the depreciated property has a
determinable useful life. 138
Next, the dissent criticized the majority's handling of the legis-
lative history. The dissent stressed the fact that the majority con-
ceded that the House Conference Report "means what it says," but
nevertheless declined to impute any value to the report. 139 Further-
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 46-47.
136. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 46 n.1. This time frame is the result of two events:
(1) ACRS depreciation deductions began in 1981, and (2) the concept of "recov-
ery property" was deleted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See id.
137. See id. at 46-47. The court gave the following examples:
Even without a determinable useful life requirement, a business that dis-
played antique automobiles, for example, and kept them under near-
ideal, humidity-controlled conditions, would still have difficulty demon-
strating the requisite exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence neces-
sary to depreciate the automobiles as recovery property. Nor is valuable
artwork purchased as office ornamentation apt to suffer anything more
damaging than occasional criticism from the tutored or untutored, and it
too would probably fail to qualify as recovery property.
Id. (citations omitted).
138. See id. at 47.
139. See id. For a discussion of the House Conference Report, see supra notes
78-79 and accompanying text.
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more, Judge Oakes clarified Congress's intent behind enacting
ACRS: to de-emphasize, not destroy the useful life concept. 140
The last issue discussed by the dissent involved the statutory
construction analysis by the majority. The dissent argued that the
majority's reading of the statute renders portions of it superflu-
ous.14 1 The dissent supported its conclusion with the observation
that all tangible property is subject to some degree of wear and tear,
so in effect all tangible property would be depreciable. 142 In addi-
tion, the dissent pointed out that the majority's reliance on the
elimination of the "salvage value" requirement as changing prior
law is misplaced, in light of the revised definition of "recovery prop-
erty," which supports a determinable useful life requirement.14 3
V. CITIcAL ANALYSIS
Although the Simon majority limited the scope of its holding to
recovery property, it nevertheless opened the floodgates of depreci-
ation deductions to all tangible property.' 44 The dissent essentially
predicted this result when it opined that all tangible property is sub-
ject to some degree of wear and tear.145 The majority never consid-
140. See id. This opinion is in accordance with the holding in Clinger v. Com-
missioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 598 (1990) (holding ACRS only de-emphasized useful
life, did not eliminate it).
141. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 48 n.1. Specifically, the dissent contended that the
majority's application of § 168's provisions to all tangible property subject to "wear
and tear" renders the phrase "of a character subject to the allowance for deprecia-
tion" in § 168(c)(1) superfluous. See id.
142. See id. at 48. See also Tom Herman, Court Rules Professional Musician May
Depreciate Cost of Bass Violin, WALL ST. J. Sept. 14, 1995 at B12 (noting that such
rulings could open doors for depreciation of many items).
143. See id.
144. See Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25, at 1263 ("'If active, regular,
and routine use are to replace determinable useful life as the touchstone of
depreciability, then I believe that the majority has opened a loophole that it is
inconceivable Congress intended.'") (quoting Liddle v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.
285, 305 (1994) (Halpern, J., dissenting)); Polito, supra note 42, at 101 (noting
that "[p]ressed to its logical extreme, this reasoning leads to the conclusion that
any tangible personal property used in a trade or business is recovery property,
regardless of exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence.") (emphasis added);
Cunningham, supra note 25, at 777-78 (predicting depreciation deductions for
land devoid of useful life but subject to wear and tear). One commentator went so
far as to say that the majority did not read the statute in its analysis, resulting in a
decision that was "flat wrong, and dangerously so." See Sheppard, The Musicians',
supra note 25, at 1259.
145. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 48 (Oakes, J., dissenting); see also Sheppard, The
Musicians" supra note 25, at 1263 (noting that "[t]he premise of tax depreciation is
that wear and tear or obsolescence is coincident with a loss in value."). For a dis-
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ered that perhaps the issue at hand was the exception and not the
rule, due to the unique role of the tangible property involved.1 46
Consequently, the court did not so limit its holding to the facts of
that particular case.
The crux of the error in the majority's analysis turns on its as-
sumption that Congress eliminated all prior law interpreting
§ 167(a) when it enacted ACRS. 147 Clearly, Congress intended to
refer to the current method under the law to determine what prop-
erty was eligible for depreciation under ACRS. 148 Consequently,
"[i] t should not be necessary to go to the legislative history to deci-
pher something as seemingly straightforward as the definition of
what is depreciable. 149
Essentially, the Simons' contention boils down to interpreting
§ 168 as making tangible property used in a trade or business that
suffers wear and tear depreciable per se, regardless of whether the
146. See Brief for the Appellant at 20, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) (noting that "[t]he issue in this case affects only a small
category of assets such as antiques, works of art or other assets that tend to appreci-
ate in value with the passage of time."); see also Polito, supra note 42, at 106 n.73
(indicating that Congress was unconcerned about creating a "few 'mistaken' subsi-
dies" in effectuating goals under ACRS).
147. See Sheppard, The Musicians', supra note 25, at 1261; see also Brief for
Appellant at 6, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237)
("[U]nder Section 167, the courts of appeals consistently denied depreciation de-
ductions for property such as antique violins and artworks on the ground that
these items lacked determinable useful lives."); Sheppard, Ferraris, supra note 102,
at 671 ("According to the Second and Third Circuits, section 167(a) and its inter-
pretations simply disappeared when Congress enacted ACRS; Congress must have
forgotten to repeal it."). In fact, Congress did not change the rules under § 167
pertinent to the eligibility of depreciation for antique musical instruments when it
enacted ACRS. See Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25, at 1261. For the rele-
vant text of § 167(a), see supra note 72.
148. See Sheppard, Ferraris, supra note 102, at 670. It is evident that Congress
intended to refer to current law, since the Conference report states that "'eligible
property includes depreciable property,'" and then immediately added that
"'[u]nder the House bill, most tangible depreciable property (real and personal)
is covered by the accelerated cost recovery system.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 97-
144, at 48 (1981), and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-215, at 206 (1981)); see also Cun-
ningham, supra note 25, at 778 ("Congress has never shifted depreciation policy
before without providing clear language indicating the change.") (emphasis
added).
Further support for this contention is found in the Blue Book. See Sheppard,
The Musicians, supra note 25, at 1261 (stating that "'[t] he Act does not change any
determination under prior law as to whether property is tangible or intangible or
depreciable or nondepreciable.'") (quotingJoint Committee on Taxation General
Explanation of ERTA, 77 (J. Comm. Print 1981)). A recent Seventh Circuit deci-
sion lends further credence to this conclusion, through its conclusion that "prior
administrative determinations carried over to ACRS." Sheppard, Ferraris, supra
note 147, at 670 (citing Walgreen Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir.
1995)).
149. Sheppard, The Musicians', supra note 25, at 1261.
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property is depreciable under § 167.150 This interpretation is in-
consistent with the statutory language, which requires the property
to be "of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation." 151
In order to ascertain such, it is necessary to look to the require-
ments imposed by § 167.152 Therefore, "in enacting Section 168,
Congress did not make depreciable any property that previously
was nondepreciable under Section 167, but, rather, only shortened
the periods for depreciating property otherwise eligible for the rea-
sonable allowance for depreciation provided by Section 167(a).' 53
Furthermore, the majority's holding undermines Congress's
intent behind ACRS, to simplify depreciation rules in order to re-
duce disagreements between taxpayers and the IRS over uncertain
concepts. 154 Specifically, the majority held that the assets are de-
preciable if they are subject to exhaustion, wear and tear or obsoles-
cence. 155 Nowhere in the majority's opinion, however, did they
explain precisely what "wear and tear" is.156 To what degree does
150. See Brief for the Appellant at 11, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237).
151. I.R.C. § 168(c) (1) (1997); see also Brief for the Appellant at 15, Simon v.
Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) (noting that Congress
would not have included this phrase in statute if it intended statute to apply to "all
tangible property used in a trade or business that is subject to some wear and
tear."); Reply Brief for the Appellant at 3, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) ("property that does not have a determinable useful life is
not property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation under Sec-
tion 167 irrespective of whether it is subject to wear and tear."). The appellant in
Liddle criticized the Tax Court's decision as "allow[ing] what it viewed to be the
'implicit' policy of Section 168 to override the explicit statutory requirement." Re-
ply Brief for the Appellant at 8, Liddle v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995)
(No. 94-7733).
152. See Brief for the Appellant at 15, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) ("Congress conditioned eligibility for ACRS on satisfaction
of the threshold standard for depreciability under Section 167.").
153. Id. at 16. The Tax Court majority conceded that the antique violin bows
needed a determinable useful life in order to be depreciable under § 167. See id.
154. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 45. But see Polito, supra note 42, at 106 (opining that
continuing requirement of determinable useful life works contrary to ACRS simpli-
fication objective). For a further discussion of the purpose of ACRS, see supra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
155. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 46-47. But see Brief for the Appellant at 5, Simon v.
Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) ("the question whether a
tangible asset used in a trade or business is subject to wear and tear is merely a
starting point and not the final determinant of whether property is depreciable
156. See Simon, 68 F.3d at 46. Although some examples of wear and tear on a
violin bow were discussed in the Tax Court decision, neither the Tax Court nor the
Second Circuit created a "floor" of the minimum amount of "wear and tear" re-
quired in order for an asset to be eligible for a depreciation deduction. For a
discussion of the examples of wear and tear that are evidenced on a violin bow, see
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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an asset need to be "worn and torn" before it is eligible for a depre-
ciation deduction? Does a mere hairline scratch on the stick suf-
fice? 157 Interpretation of the uncertain concept "wear and tear"
will inevitably lead to further disagreements between taxpayers and
the IRS, a result that Congress expressly intended to eliminate
through the effectuation of ACRS. 158
Property used in a trade or business that is subject to wear and
tear may nonetheless be nondepreciable if it does not have a deter-
minable useful life or does not decline in value predictably. 15 9 The
antique Tourte violin bows purchased by the Simons satisfy both
criteria for nondepreciability. Their value as collectibles increases
over time and their value does not decline predictably, 160 since the
amount of care given to the violin bows during their use is the sole
factor that effects the length of their playing life. 161 Therefore, the
Second Circuit's holding undercuts the basic premise behind de-
preciation, to compensate the taxpayer for the declining value of
an investment, because it endorses depreciating assets with unlim-
ited useful lives. 1 62
157. See Brief for the Appellant at 15, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) ("all tangible property used in a trade or business necessar-
ily is subject to some wear and tear .. ").
158. For a discussion of Congress's policy objectives behind ACRS, see supra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
159. See Kahn, supra note 38, at 14 n.53 ("[n]ot all assets have fixed useful
lives, and therefore not all assets are depreciable."). But see Polito, supra note 42, at
97 (observing that through ACRS, "Congress abandoned the one measure
designed to prevent the depreciation of increasing value assets.").
160. See Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25 at 1262. Actually, the bows
each appreciated in value by $10,000 during their ownership. See id. But see Brief
for the Appellees at 6, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-
4237) (reiterating Tax Court ruling that "[i]t makes no difference . . .that the
bows have appreciated in value and will probably have 'value as collectibles' even
after they are 'played out."').
161. See Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25 at 1261. In this case, the
Simons could not predict the playing life of their violin bows when used regularly
and carefully maintained. See id.
162. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 754 (noting that premise behind de-
preciation is that all machinery is marching toward ajunk heap); Kahn, supra note
38, at 14 n.53 ("the shareholder's investment is treated as continuing in perpetuity,
and the shareholder can recover his cost only by selling the share or by having it
redeemed by the corporation."); Bittker & McMahon, Jr., supra note 64, 12.4.8
("Depreciation and ACRS deductions are also denied to assets that are not ad-
versely affected by the passage of time or by use in the taxpayer's business.., since
their value on retirement from use is likely to equal or exceed the taxpayer's origi-
nal cost or other basis.").
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VI. IMPACT
It is likely that the split amongst the circuits on whether an
asset needs a useful life in order to be depreciable will not be re-
solved anytime in the near future.1 63 One path for the resolution of
this issue is for the Commissioner to petition for certiorari in order
to reconcile the split circuits. 64 Another solution is for Congress to
repeal or clarify the statute through a substantive change in the ac-
tual wording or by revising the treasury regulations. 65 Or perhaps,
the musical instruments could be bifurcated into two components:
one practical, the other aesthetic. 166
Although the future implications of the Simon decision are un-
known at this time, some commentators fear that it will create a
"double benefit" to owners of valuable antique instruments. 167 An-
163. See Dodge & Geier, supra note 97, at 617 (noting that circuit split exists if
current law is unchanged from pre-198 1 law on depreciability issue). Further-
more, the IRS has taken a "no acquiescence" stance on this issue. See Telephone
Interview with David L. Segal, Attorney for Liddle in Liddle v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d
329 (3d. Cir. 1995) (Jan. 30, 1997). Apparently, the union to which the Simons
belonged lacks confidence in the stability of these decisions: it refused to pay the
Simons' legal fees because in their eyes, the Simons won nothing. See id. For a
discussion of the circuit split on this issue, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
164. See Sheppard, Ferraris, supra note 102, at 672 (suggesting argument "that
there is a conflict among the circuits as to just how much of section 167(a) and
administrative guidance promulgated under it Congress re-enacted when it en-
acted ACRS," for Supreme Court to grant certiorari).
165. See Polito, supra note 42, at 107 n.77 (suggesting that "it would be possi-
ble to amend section 168 to limit ACRS recovery to assets with useful lives within
some maximum range."). In Judge Ruwe's concurring opinion in the Tax Court's
decision in Simon, he stated that those who object to the holding should complain
to Congress instead of the court, since the anomalous result here is a small price to
pay in order to effectuate Congress's greater goal of simplifying the tax code. See
Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25, at 1260; see also Cunningham, supra note
25, at 777 (noting that "[b]oth the statutory language and the legislative history
are ambiguous."); Polito, supra note 42, at 101 (observing that "[t]he Simon and
Liddle cases demonstrate that the courts cannot fully reconcile all of Congress's
conflicting statements . . . [and] the statutory language neither justifies nor re-
futes" either court's interpretation of such language). For a further discussion of
the Tax Court's decision in Simon, see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
166. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 281 (Gerber, J., dissenting) (advocating bifurcated
approach). Under the bifurcation approach, the only basis eligible for deprecia-
tion would be the basis attributable to the practical component. See Sheppard, The
Musicians', supra note 25, at 1260. The bifurcation solution, opined by Judge
Gerber's dissenting opinion in the Tax Court decision, has been subject to much
skepticism. See id. See also Simon, 103 T.C. at 284 (Halpern, J., dissenting) (ques-
tioning wisdom of bifurcation approach); id. at 168 (Beghe, J., concurring) (criti-
cizing bifurcation approach as inadministrable); Sheppard, The Musicians, supra
note 25, at 1264 (criticizing bifurcation approach as inadministrable, although per-
haps theoretically sound). For further discussion of Judge Gerber's dissent in the
Tax Court decision, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
167. See Sheppard, The Musicians, supra note 25, at 1261. A "double benefit"
would accrue to the owners since the instruments would be depreciated now, cre-
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other concern encompasses the scope of the decision. It has been
suggested that the IRS is not really concerned with musicians: in-
stead, they are concerned with how far the depreciability of antique
objects will go. 168 Until there is a clear basis for the courts to de-
cide the issue, musicians will continue to fiddle around their tax
liability by orchestrating a new ensemble of deductions. 169
Christine M. Gorgone
ating the initial benefit, and then the value of future depreciation would be capi-
talized into the selling price, constituting the second benefit, resulting in a
"double benefit." See id.
168. See Herman, supra note 142, at B12 (suggesting antique office furniture
as example); see also Brief for the Appellant at 6-7, Liddle v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d
329 (3d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-7733) ("the [Tax Court] majority's decision provided
wealthy taxpayers with an incentive to stuff their offices with valuable, antique fur-
niture to take advantage of the accelerated depreciation periods provided by Sec-
tion 168.").
169. See Brief for the Appellees at 7, Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-4237) (noting Chief Judge Hamblen's dissent in Tax Court de-
cision, opining that "the majority creat[ed] an unsuitable 'tax shelter for
musicians.'").
[Vol. 4: p. 327
28
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/5
